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Matched employer-employee data exhibits both wage and productivity dispersion across firms and
suggest that a linear relationship holds between the average wage paid and a firm productivity. The
purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that these facts can be explained by a search and matching
model when firms are heterogenous with respect to productivity, are composed of many workers, and
face diminishing returns to labor given the wage paid to identical workers is the solution to the Stole-Zwiebel
bilateral bargaining problem. Helpman and Iskhoki (2008) show that a unique single wage (degenerate)
equilibrium solution to the model exists in this environment. In this paper, I demonstrate that another
equilibrium exists that can be characterized by a non-degenerate distribution of wages in which more
productive firms pay more if employed workers are able to search. Generically this dispersed wage
equilibrium is unique and exists if and only if firms are heterogenous with respect to factor productivity.
Finally, employment is lower in the dispersed wage equilibrium than in the single wage equilibrium








The simplicity of the canonical search and matching model oﬀers many ad-
vantages for the purpose of understanding the determinants of unemploy-
ment. Furthermore, the model explains wage dispersion and a positive cross
￿rm correlation between wage and productivity in the heterogeneous ￿rm
case. However, the assumptions that a ￿rm is composed of a single worker
and employer and that there is no search on-the-job are obviously limiting
restrictions. For example, the model in the form does not speak directly to
the well known correlation between productivity and ￿rm size (Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2008)). The principal purpose of this paper is
to demonstrate that the canonical model￿s implications for wage dispersion
continue to hold and are consistent with these addition facts when the model
is generalized to allow for many worker ￿rms provided that search on-the-job
is possible.
A model of strategic bilateral wage bargaining when ￿rms employ many
worker is formulated and solved by Stole and Zwiebel (1996). In their formu-
lation, the employer bargains with each worker as though he or she were the
marginal employee. Because the wage outcome decreases with the number
of workers employed in the diminishing returns case, they show that there
is an incentive to "over employ" as a means of reducing the wage paid to
all workers. Recently, Helpman and Iskhoki (2008) demonstrate that Stole-
Zwiebel wages paid to identical workers are equalized across employers in
a steady state search equilibrium when the production technology exhibits
diminishing returns with respect to labor, even when ￿rm factor productiv-
ities diﬀer. This result would seem to contradict the claim of this paper.
However, the Helpman-Iskhoki analysis does not consider the possibility of
search on-the-job. If allowed, a dispersed wage equilibrium also exists.
I nt h i sp a p e r ,t h ew a g ep a i da te v e r yp o i n ti nt i m ei st h es o l u t i o nt ot h e
Stole-Zwiebel bargaining problem. In this enviroment, I start by verifying
the Helpman-Iskhoki conclusion that a single wage equilibrium always exists.
Next I demonstrate that a second equilibrium exists characterized by wage
dispersion if ￿rms diﬀer with respect to productivity and search by employed
workers is not ruled out by assumption. Furthermore, generically there is
only one disperse wage equilibrium in which more productive employers over
a higher wage. Finally, I establish that employment is lower in the dispersed
wage equilibrium than in the single wage equilibrium. However, because
aggregate employment in the single wage equilibrium exceeds the social opti-
2mum for the reasons pointed out by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), social welfare
need not be lower in the dispersed wage equilibrium.
There is clearly a relationship between the dispersed wage equilibrium in
the search and matching model and the equilibrium wage distribution im-
plied by the dynamic monopsony models of Burdett and Judd (1983) and
Burdett and Mortensen (1998); particularly with the reinterpreted version
of the Burdett-Mortensen model found in Mortensen (2003). Although the
relationship is close, the results are not isomorphic. Wage dispersion in the
both models arises because a continuum of wage-employment combinations
exist that yield the same expected return to posting a vacancy. When the
cost of posting vacancies is linear and the same for all ￿rms, the equilibrium
wage-employment relationship lies along this locus for each level of produc-
tivity. When ￿rms diﬀer with respect to productivity, the wages paid by more
productive employers are higher at any level of employment. The search and
matching model with diminishing returns to labor shares this feature with
the Burdett-Mortensen dynamic monopsony model. However, forward look-
ing strategic wage setting behavior by employers in the dynamic monopsony
model generates dispersion even when there are no diﬀerences in ￿rm produc-
tivity for strategic reasons that are not present when the wage is the outcome
of a bargaining problem over current output, as assumed in this paper. For
this reason, there is generally is no disperse wage equilibrium in the search
and matching model when ￿rms are homogenous.
2 The Model
The labor market is composed of a unit measure of employers and a contin-
uum of identical workers of size  . Labor is the only input and production is
generally subject to diminishing returns. Let p(x)f(n) denote the production
function of ￿rm x ∈ [0,1] where the variable n is a measure of employment
and p(x) is total factor productivity. The base line production function f(n)
is increasing and concave. Without loss of generality, ￿rms with a higher
index x a r e( w e a k l y )m o r ep r o d u c t i v ei nt h ew e a ks e n s et h a tx>x 0 implies
p(x) ≥ p(x0). Given this convention, x is equal to the ￿rm￿s percentile rank
in the distribution of productivity.
Workers are identical and can be either employed or not. While unem-
ployed they receive an income b, which I interpreted as the ￿ow value of
home production. While employed, they earn a wage w which is determined
3as the outcome of a bilateral bargaining problem speci￿ed later. A worker
can choose to search or not at a unit intensity in the both unemployment
and employment states. Finally, all agents are risk neutral.
2.1 Worker Search
The workers￿ common value of unemployment solves the Bellman equation





maxhW(w) − U,0idF(w) − εφ
￿
(1)
where φ is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the worker searches and 0
otherwise, ε is a small ￿xed cost of search, b represents the value of home
production, r is the interest rate, λ is the job ￿nding rate, δ is the job
destruction rate, W(w) is the value of employment at wage w and F(w) is the
distribution of wage oﬀers. The value of employment is the expected present
value of the worker future income when employed. For a ￿rm paying wage
w, the state contingent value of employment satis￿es the Bellman equation
rW(w)=





maxhW(z) − W(w),0idF(z) − εφ
“
. . (2)
Of course, the worker can choose whether or not to search when employed
as well as when unemployed and does so to maximize expected future income.
Although the "search technology" as represented by the oﬀer arrival rate
may be diﬀerent in the two states, we assume they are same in the paper for
simplicity. For the same reason we also assume that the out of pocket cost





1 if unemployed and 1 − F(b) > 0
1 if employed at value W and and 1 − F(w) > 0
0 otherwise
(3)
I nw o r d s ,aw o r k e rs e a r c h e si fa n do n l yi ft h ee x p e c t e dg a i ni nv a l u ei s
positive. By implication, trade requires that the highest wage oﬀered in the
market exceed the value of home production. Furthermore, all but those
employed at the highest oﬀer, w, search if wages are disperse. Below I only
consider the case in which trade takes place in equilibrium so that φ(b)=1
and assume that φ(w)=1if and only if 1 − F(w) > 0.
4Given that employed workers do search, they move if and only if oﬀered
a strictly higher employment value. Hence, for a ￿rm that pays w,t h e
separation rate is
s(w)=δ + λφ(w)(1 − F(w)). (4)
Because an unemployed worker accepts all oﬀers in equilibrium and an em-




u +( 1− u)φ(w)G(w)
u +( 1− u)φ(w)
‚
(5)
where u i st h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e ,G(w) is the fraction of employed workers
at ￿rms that pay wage w or less, and η i st h er a t ea tw h i c he m p l o y e r sc o n t a c t
searching workers per vacancy posted. Because s(w) is decreasing and h(w)
is increasing, an increase in the wage reduces turnover if and only if employed
workers search.
Note that equation (4) and (2) imply W0(w)=1 /(r + s(w)). Hence, by
rearranging terms and integrating by parts, equation (2) can be rewritten as












Therefore equation (1) and the de￿nition of the reservation wage U = W(b w)
imply that an unemployed worker accepts a job oﬀer if and only if the wage
exceeds the solution to








In other words, if employed workers search, then the reservation wage is the
value of home production. But, if there is no incentive to search on-the-job,
then the reservation wage is equal to the value of home production plus the
option value of continued search.
2.2 Wage Bargaining
A ￿rm cannot commit to long term contracts and the employer bargains with
each worker individually, Stole and Zwiebel (1996) show that the solution to
5a strategic non-cooperative bilateral bargaining in this environment yields
a wage-employment pro￿le that re￿ect Shapley values. Speci￿cally, Stole
and Zwiebel assume that the current wage is the outcome of a sequence
of bilateral negotiations with its employees where each is regarded as the
marginal worker. Costless renegotiation takes place whenever a worker leaves
or is hired. In this paper, we adopt this wage determination model.
To justify their assumption, Stole and Zwiebel design a extensive form
strategic bilateral bargaining game of a general Rubinstein (1982) kind be-
tween the employer and marginal worker. The game is composed of a se-
quence of negotiation rounds in which the role of the proposer alternates
between worker and employer while the other party either accepts or rejects
the proposed split of the surplus value attributable to employing the mar-
ginal worker. The game continues until either an agreement is reached or
negotiations break down. The default position of the employer is no revenue
and for the worker is a wage equivalent b w.
As the ￿rm￿s gross pro￿t ￿ow is
π(n,p)=pf(n) − wn, (7)
renegotiation with the marginal worker under complete information leads










=( 1− β)(w − b w). (8)
where β, the worker￿s share of surplus, represents the bargaining power of the
marginal workers. It can be interpreted as the probability that the worker
makes the oﬀer in any bargaining round. As Stole and Zwiebel show, the
solution to this diﬀerential equation, the wage bargaining outcome function,
is the generalized Shapley value







which is a decreasing function of employment given diminishing returns.
Stole and Zwiebel assume that the worker can instantaneously ￿nd em-
ployment elsewhere at the wage b w if bargaining breaks down. However, given
search friction, we follow Cahuc et al. (2007) and Helpman and Iskhoki
(2008) by supposing that unemployed search is the workers outside option in
6the bargaining problem. Of course, in the linear production function case,
f(n)=n, the wage reduces to that in the canonical model, the weighted
average of the reservation wage and labor productivity. If the production
function is Cobb-Douglas of the form f(n)=nα,α ∈ (0,1) then the wage
equation is also linear in average product per worker,
w(n,p)=( 1− β)b w +
￿
βα





However, this equation does not imply that the wage varies with p in equi-
librium because employment is endogenous.
Were ￿rms composed of a single worker, the employer clearly has an
incentive to renegotiation if that employee receives an outside oﬀer to the
extent that doing so might aﬀect retention. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2006) allow outside oﬀer matching in such an environment. However, there
are also good reasons for the employer to adopt a policy of not to respond
to outside oﬀers. As Mortensen (1978) points out, oﬀer matching encourages
ineﬃcient rent seeking search eﬀort. As a consequence, Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2004) show that conditions exist for which an employer would commit
exante not to match. In fact, except in jobs where worker productivity is
general and observable to third parties, anecdotal evidence suggests that this
policy dominate in the labor market.
In the case of multi-worker ￿rms, interpersonal comparison of earning
of observably identical workers provide another reason for a "non-response"
policy. Oﬀer matching induces intra-￿rm wage dispersion, which is can be
costly to the extent that equity norms are important. Also dispersion of
this form violates antidiscrimination laws when workers are interchangeable
in the ￿rm. For these reasons, I require equal treatment for observably
equivalent workers, which rules out oﬀer matching in the environment under
study. Instead, a worker stays if doing so yields a higher value under the
current and expected future wage agreements.
2.3 Job Vacancies
A ￿rm chooses to post v vacancies. The hire ￿ow yield per vacancy is h(w)
and the separate rate is s(w) as de￿ned respectively by equations (4) and
(5). Hence, the law of motion for a ￿rm￿s labor force is
œ n = vh(w(n,p)) − s(w(n,p))n (11)
7where w(n,p) denotes the Stole-Zwiebel wage outcome function de￿ned in









where c is the cost of posting a vacancy and J(n,p)=∂V/∂N is the value of
the marginal worker to the ￿rm. By the envelope theorem, the value of the
marginal worker satis￿es






v(n,p)=a r gm a x
v≥0
{h(w(n,p))vJ(n,p) − cv} (14)
is the optimal number of vacancies posted. The ￿r s tt e r mo nt h eR H So f
(13) is the pro￿t earned on the marginal worker as de￿n e di ne q u a t i o n( 7 ) ,
the second term is the cost of separations per worker, and the last two terms
account for the total eﬀect of an additional worker on the capital gain or loss
associated with any rate of change in the size of the labor force.
There are two eﬀects of adding a worker to the ￿rm￿s labor force that are
not present in the canonical model search and matching model. However, the
￿rst of the two, the impact of a change in size on the value of the marginal
match, is not unfamiliar when labor productivity diminishes. The second
eﬀect, represented by the last term on the RHS of (13), is more novel. This
negative eﬀect on the marginal value represents the fact than an increase in
the number of employees drives down the wage thereby decreasing the yield
on vacancies, h(w), and increasing the separation rate, s(w). Of course,
equations (9) and (4) imply that this eﬀe c ti sp r e s e n ti fa n do n l yi fe m p l o y e d
worker search or the wage paid by the ￿rm is not the lowest in the market.
These facts provide the rational for all of the original results found in the
paper.
Because the vacancy posting cost, c, is constant by assumption, the ￿rm
posts no vacancies if the vacancy posting cost exceeds the expected return,
h(w(n0,p)J(n0,p), evaluated at its initial labor force size n0. In this case,
the ￿rm either allows its labor force to fall through attrition until equality
8h o l d so ri ti m m e d i a t e l yl a y so ﬀ the redundant workers if doing so is costless.
Once its steady state size is achieved, the ￿rm posts the vacancies needed to
replace those that quit. On the other hand, if the return exceeds the cost,
the ￿rm instantaneously hires the workers required to achieve an equality
between the marginal cost and expected return to posting a vacancy. In
sum, the ￿rm￿s labor force size quickly adjusts to its steady state, which is
de￿ned by the requirement that the cost of posting a vacancy is equal to its
expected return
c = h(w(n,p))J(n,p), (15)





is that required to keep the labor force at the desired steady state size. In the
job search literature, equation (15) is referred to as the "free entry" condition
for vacancy creation.
2.4 Labor Market Matching
The aggregate ￿ow of matches that form per period is determined by an
increasing, concave, and homogenous of degree one matching function of the
aggregate number of vacancies and searching worker, denoted M(v,z).T h e
rates at which workers are randomly matched with vacant jobs and vacancies
with workers are respectively
λ = M(v,z)/z = m(θ) (17)
and
η = M(v,z)/v = m(θ)/θ (18)
where m(θ)=M(θ, ),
z =[ u +( 1− u)φ(w)]  (19)
is the measure of search workers, and θ = v/z is market tightness. Note that
θ = v/  when employed workers search.
93 Steady State Equilibria
3.1 Steady State Conditions
In a market steady state, the unemployment rate and the distribution of
employment over ￿rms are stationary by assumption. As the steady state







The analogous requirement that the ￿ow into employment with a ￿rm that
oﬀers value w or less is equal to the ￿ow out determines the employment
weighted distribution of wages paid by employers, given any distribution of
values over vacancies oﬀered. Formally,
λF(w)u  =( δ + m(θ)φ(w)[1 − F(w)])G(w)(1 − u) 
where the left side is the ￿ow of workers into employment paying wage w or
less and the right side is the ￿ow out. Hence, the steady state relationship
between the distribution of wages paid employed workers and the distribution
of wages oﬀered over vacancies is given by
G(w)=
δF(w)
δ + m(θ)φ(w)[1 − F(w)]
. (21)
These steady state conditions equations (5) and (18) imply that vacancy
yield and the separation rate are inversely related in a steady state. That is,
h(w)=η
•
u +( 1− u)φ(w)G(w)







s(w)=δ + m(θ)φ(w)[1 − F(w)] (23)
from (4) and (17).
To maintain employment at its steady state level n,a ne m p l o y e rm u s t
post v = s(w)n/h(w) vacancies. This fact and the steady state relationship
between the vacancy yield and the separation rate function given by (22),














00(zn(w,p))dz > 0 (25)
and n(w,p) is the inverse of the Stole-Zwiebel wage function de￿n e di ne q u a -
tion (9).
At this point, I remind the reader that a reduction in the wage has no
eﬀect on either the vacancy yield or the separation rate if the wage paid is

















where w is the lower support of F(w).
The function g(w,p) plays a crucial role in the analysis in the paper.
It represents the absolute amount by which the wage bill paid to existing
employees falls when a new worker is hired or rises when an existing employee
leaves the ￿rm. Because
w =( 1− β)b w +
￿
β


















β dz =( 1− α)α(w − (1 − β)b w).
in the Cobb-Douglas case. Note that the function happens to be independent
of ￿rm productivity.
3.2 Degenerate Wage
I begin by verifying the Helpman-Iskhoki ￿nding that a steady state equi-
librium exists with the property that the "law of one price" holds. Since
11employed workers do not search is such an equilibrium (φ(w) ≡ 0),t h e
FONC for an optimal choice of vacancies, c = h(w)J(n(w,p)) and equation
(26) imply that the common wage paid is








Since c/h(w) is the expected cost of ￿lling a vacancy, the diﬀerence between
the wage paid and the reservation wage demand is the amortized expected
cost to the employer of ￿nding a replacement for the marginal worker. This
fact generalized the Stole-Zwiebel ￿nding that wage paid must equal the
worker￿s outside option in a model without matching friction.
Of course, equations (22) and (23) require that s(w)=δ and h(w)=
m(θ)/θ and
b w = b + m(θ)
￿









from equation (6). Hence, the solution to the system for the wage is

















Deﬁnition 1: A degenerate steady state equilibrium is a wage w and a
market tightness parameter θ that satisfy (28), and (29) .
The following conditions are maintained:
Assumption 1: The job ￿nding rate m(θ) is increasing and strictly concave
function of θ and m(0) = 0,a n dlimθ→0{θ/m(θ)} =0 .
Assumption 2: T h eb a s e l i n ep r od u c t i o nf u n c t i o nf(n) is increasing, strictly
concave thrice diﬀerentiable, and satis￿es the Inada conditions, limn→0 f0(n)=
∞ and limn→∞f0(n)=0 .
Proposition 1 A unique degenerate steady state equilibrium with positive
market tightness exists.
12Proof. S i n c e( 2 8 )d e ￿nes a continuous and strictly increasing functional
relationship between w and θ, the right side of (29) can be represented as a
continuous decreasing function of θ. As the LHS is continuos and increasing
in θ, there is at most one solution for θ. Because the LHS is zero when
θ =0 , but the RHS is strictly positive, the equilibrium tightness is unique
and strictly positive.
3.3 Equilibrium Wage Dispersion
Next, I turn to the principal focus of the paper, the implications of search-
on-the job for wage dispersion in the canonical matching model. If wage
are disperse and employed workers search (φ(w)=1 )as a consequence, the
reservation wage is b w = b by equation (6), the value of home production.
Therefore, the free entry condition for vacancy creation (15) and equation
(26) imply that the lowest wage paid in a market steady state is














(r + δ + m(θ))
cδm(θ)
(δ + m(θ))θ
where the second equality follows from (22) and (23). Equation (26) also
implies that any equilibrium wage oﬀer density must satisfy
F
0(w)=









s(w)=δ + m(θ)[1 − F(w)]. (33)
Whether g(w,p) is invariant with respect to p is important for our analy-
sis. Indeed, in the special case in which g(w,p) is independent of p,( 3 1 )
is an ordinary diﬀerential equation that can be unique solved for the oﬀer
distribution for any speci￿cation of an initial condition, the value of F(w).
This case is unique to the Cobb-Douglas production function speci￿cation.
13Lemma 2 The only baseline production functions in the set that satisfy As-
sumption 2 and ∂g(w,p)/∂p ≡ 0 a r em e m b e r so ft h el o gl i n e a rf a m i l y .
Proof. From equation (9), the function n(w,p) i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o









By implication, n(w,p) is a function of the LHS of this expression and so is



























together with f(0) = 0 and f0(n) > 0 imply f(n)=n1−a/(1−a), 0 <a<1.
Suﬃciency is implied by equation (27).
When the eﬀect of adding a worker to turnover costs, the denominator
of (31), is not invariant to productivity, then the wage oﬀer density depends
on the productivity of any ￿rm paying w. In this case, another diﬀerential
equation is needed to fully describe an equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution.
Let ω(x), x ∈ [0,1], represent a function that assign a steady state wage
rate to ￿rm x and let z(x) denote the fraction of vacancies posted by those
with productivity less than or equal to that the ￿rm of productivity rank x.
We seek a steady state equilibrium in which more productive employers pay





h(ω(x))(1 − β))(ω(x) − b)/β − (r + s(ω(x)))c
,x∈ [0,1) (34)
which provides one of the two diﬀerential equations for the system. The other
14is supplied by the employment identity




























3.4 Existence and Uniqueness
Deﬁnition 3 A monotone increasing steady state dispersed wage equilibrium
is an increasing wage assignment function ω :[ 0 ,1] → [ω(0),ω(1)],av a c a n c y
c.d.f. z :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1], and a market tightness parameter θ that satisfy
equations (34), (35), and (36).
The following fact rules out multiple disperse wage equilibria except in
the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Lemma 4 If employed worker search and ∂g(w,p)/∂p 6=0 ,t h e n￿rms that
pay the same wage w m u s th a v et h es a m ep r o d u c t i v i t y .
Proof. Because the free entry condition, equation (26), can be written as
c =
h(w)(w − b)
r + s(w)+2 m(θ)g(w,p)F0(w)
,
ω(x1)=ω(x2)=w implies g(w,p(x2))−g(w,p(x1)) = 0 for all x1 and x2.
For a given value of the tightness parameter θ, one can use the phase
diagram implied by the ODE system to characterize the set of solutions to
the equations that could serve as possible wage oﬀer distributions when p(x)
15is continuous. Although the phase space generally has three dimensions with
each point representing a particular (z,ω,x) combination, a slice of the space
at any given value of x has the qualitative properties illustrated in Figure 1.
The curve in the space with end points labeled w0 and w1 is the locus along
which the denominator of the expression on the right side of equation (34)
is zero. In other words, the curve is de￿ned by
￿
m(θ)δ
θ(δ + m(θ)[1 − z(x)])
¶
(1 − β)(ω −b)/β − (r +δ + m(θ)[1 − z(x)])c =0
(37)
where w0 is the solution for ω when z(0) = 0 and w1 is the solution when
z(1) = 1. Because the curve is independent of x, it is in the same position
in Figure 1 for all x.
The curves in the phase diagram represented by arrows are the solution
trajectories of the system where the points of each indicates the "direction
of motion" as x increases. Note that there are two solution trajectories that
initiate from any point on the curve de￿ned by (37). Local multiplicity
arises because ω0(0) converges to in￿nity as any such point is approached. In
other words, the standard suﬃcient condition for a unique local solution to
the ODE system, Lipschitz continuity, does not hold. However, because the
RHS of (35) is always strictly positive, all solution trajectory that initiate
a b o v ea n dt ot h er i g h to ft h ec u r v ea r eu n i q u ea n dt e n dt o w a r dt h en o r t he a s t
in the diagram while only those to the left of it move northwest. Obviously,
only the former can represent a possible oﬀer distribution density function
since F0(w)=z0(x)/ω0(x) > 0 implies that z0(x) > 0 must hold. Finally,
for each candidate, the upper support of the distribution, w,i st h ev a l u eo f
ω at the point where the trajectory intersects the line z =1 .
Still, we need two initial conditions to determine a unique particular
solution. Of course, equation (30) provides one; namely, ω(0) = w = w0
from (30) and (37) given the equilibrium value of θ. As an implication
of Lemma (2), one can generally infer the second boundary condition. In
the absence of a mass point in the distribution of productivity at it￿s lower
support, equivalently p(x) is strictly increasing at x =0 ,t h e nF(w)=0 .I n
other words, the candidate solution for the wage oﬀer distribution function in
t h i sc a s ei st h et r a j e c t o r yt h a to r i g i n a t e sa tt h ep o i n t(ω(0),z(0)) = (w0,0).
An equilibrium value of the market tightness solves equation (36) when its
RHS is evaluated using the oﬀer distribution candidate uniquely associated
with the solution value of θ. Obviously, equation (30) implies that the lowest
16wage of the candidate distribution increases with market tightness. Since
s(w) increases and h(w) decreases with θ from (32) and (33), equation (31)
and F0(w)=z0(ω(x))/ω0(x) > 0 imply that the slopes of the all the solution
trajectories fall continuous with θ. As a consequence, the wage distribution is
stochastically increasing in θ which implies that the RHS of (36) is positive,
continuous and decreasing function of θ.
To sum up, the following results holds.
Proposition 5 If the productivity distribution is atomless (p(x) is continu-
ous and strictly increasing), a montone steady state equilibrium exists. Except
in the case of the log linear family of production functions, there is only one
and it is atomless.
Corollary 6 If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then a continuum
of equilibria exists even if all ￿rms are equally productive.
3.5 The Cobb-Douglas Case
The fact that a continuum of equilibria exist in the Cobb-Douglas case is
somewhat disturbing, since that speci￿cation is particularly convenient in
empirical work. Of course, no actual production function is exactly log lin-
ear. Hence, we can regard the disperse wage equilibrium of interest as that
associated with the requirement that there is no mass point at the lowest
wage, at least when there is no mass point of ￿rms with the lowest produc-
tivity.
Moreover, the assumption that the cost of posting vacancies is a constant
if also a simpli￿cation. Since adjustment to steady states is not instanta-
neous in fact, a convex cost of vacancy posting is a more realistic speci￿-
cation assumption. In this case, the increasing marginal cost function c0(v)
would replace c in all the equations above. It is a straight foreword but
time consuming to show that all the other equations of the model as well
as the arguments made hold in this generalization, at least in steady state.
Furthermore, multiplicity also vanishes in the Cobb-Douglas case.
Proposition 7 If the cost of posting vacancies is increasing and strictly con-
vex, then employers pay the same wage if and only if they are of the same
type.









r + s(w)+2 m(θ)g(w,p)F0(w)
, (38)
in any steady state. As c00(•) > 0 and np > 0 both hold, ω(x1)=ω(x2) if and
only if p(x1)=p(x2).
4 Comparing the Equilibria
As h(w) <m (θ)/θ from (32) when employed workers search, the lower sup-
port of the wage distribution in the disperse equilibrium is greater than the
equilibrium single wage when evaluated at the same level of market tightness
by equations (28) and (30). Workers receive more rent when they search
while employed because the cost of replacing the marginal worker is higher
given the same arrival rates. Because higher wages lower the incentive to
post vacancies, the level of market tightness will be lower and unemploy-
ment will be higher in the disperse wage equilibrium. Indeed, an application
of the argument used to prove existence and uniqueness of the dispersed
wage equilibrium implies that the following relationship between wages and
employment in the two equilibria.
Proposition 8 Market tightness is lower in a dispersed wage equilibrium
than in the single wage equilibrium and the equilibrium single wage is less
than the upper support of the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution.
Proof. Suppose that employed worker search and for the moment consider
t h ec a s ei nw h i c hv a l u eo fm a r k e tt i g h t n e s si nt h ed e g e n e r a t ee q u i l i b r i u m ;
call it θ
∗.W h e n θ = θ
∗, In this case, w0 >w ∗ in Figure 1 which implies
that all the wages in the support of the candidate distribution exceed w∗.
As a consequence, the LHS of (36) is strictly greater than the RHS when
θ = θ
∗ which in turn implies that the unique value of θ in the disperse wage
equilibrium is strictly less than θ
∗. Obviously, an analogous argument implies
that the value of θ for which the upper support of the wage distribution is
equal to w∗ is such that the LHS of (36) is strictly greater than the RHS.
Hence, the support of the equilibrium wage distribution includes the single
wage equilibrium in its interior.
Employment is lower in the disperse wage equilibrium because employed
workers have an incentive to search for a higher paying job. As a consequence
18of search on-the-job, the separation rate is higher than it would be for all
but the highest paying ￿rm and, consequently, turnover cost per worker are
higher. In addition, the act of hiring another worker reduces the wage paid
which adversely aﬀe c tt h en e tc h a n g ei ne m p l o y m e n ta t t r i b u t a b l et op o s t i n g
a vacancy. Both eﬀects reduced the incentive to hire which results in lower
employment in steady state.
Does lower employment imply less welfare in the dispersed wage equilib-
rium? Not necessarily. As Stole and Zwiebel (1996) point out in a particular
equilibrium setting, their bilateral intra-￿rm bargaining solution provides
an incentive for employers to "over employ" as a means of driving down
wage costs. Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer (2007) suggest that this conclusion
c o n t i n u e st oh o l di ns e a r c he q u i l i b r i u mw h e n￿rms are composed of many
workers and ￿rms are equally productive. Below I extend the ineﬃciency
result to include the case of heterogenous ￿rms. Hence, wage dispersion and
the additional search it induces oﬀ sets to some extent the incentive to over
employ.
Suppose that the planner chooses vacancies for every ￿rm to maximize
the expected present value of aggregate income including home production.
As is well known, search externalities generally exist in a matching model.
However, as both Pissarides (1984) and Hosios (1990) have shown, these are
internalized in the canonical search and matching model if the employers￿
share of match rent is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with
respect to vacancies. In this section, I demonstrate that employment in the
single wage equilibrium exceeds the solution to the planner￿s problem when
the Hosios condition holds and production exhibits diminishing returns. In
addition to excessive employment, workers are generally misallocated across
￿r m sa sw e l lw h e n￿rm productivities diﬀer.
The law of motion for employment in ￿rm x is
œ n(x)=v(x)q(θ) − δn(x),x∈ [0,1]
where v(x) represents vacancies posted and θ is market tightness. Letting
Ψ represent the maximal expected value of future aggregate income, the
19continuous time Bellman equation is
rΨ =m a x
v(x)

    


























0 Ψn(x) [v(x)q(θ) − δn(x)]dx

    
    
(39)
where Ψ is the value of the optimal program, Ψn(x) is its partial derivative
with respect to n(x), and λ is the shadow price of market tightness. The
FONCs for interior vacancy choices are for every x ∈ [0,1]

























(r + δ)Ψn(x) = p(x)f
0(n(x)) − b − λθ + œ Ψn(x)
by the envelope theorem.
In steady state, the marginal value of a worker is the same across ￿rms.
Letting Ψn(x) = Ψn for all x, market tightness satis￿es
Ψn [q(θ)+θq
0(θ)] − c =0 (40)
where the common marginal value of a worker solves
(r + δ)Ψn = p(x)f





cθ,x ∈ [0,1] (41)










However, in a degenerate wage market equilibrium, equations (8) and
(28) require
β (p(x)f
0(n(x)) + g(p(x),w) − w)=( 1− β)
￿


















In combination, these equations require
p(x)f







while equation (40) and (41) require
p(x)f














Given the Hosios condition







intra-￿rm bargaining generates two distortions. First, because the marginal
contribution to pro￿t, p(x)f0(n(x)) + g(w,p(x)), is equalized across ￿rms
in the degenerate wage equilibrium rather than the marginal products, the
allocation of workers across ￿rms is not output maximizing except in the
Cobb-Douglas production function case where g(w,p(x)) is independent of
p(x). Second, because g(w,p(x)) > 0,e m p l o y m e n ti ne v e r y￿rm is too high
given tightness.
Proposition 9 If the Hosios condition holds, then the value of market tight-
ness in the single wage equilibrium exceeds that in the planner￿s solution.
Proof. By comparison of (43) and (44), the solution for n(x) is larger to the
￿rst equation is larger than that of the second for all w and p(x) given that
g(w,p(x)) > 0 given the same value of θ. Hence, if the value of θ is chosen
to be the solution to the planner￿s problem, the RHS of (42) exceeds the left
in the single wage equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium value of θ,t h a tw h i c h
equates to side, must be larger.
21A l t h o u g hId i dn o ta l l o wf o rs e a r c ho n - t h e - j o bi nf o r m u l a t i n gt h es o c i a l
planner￿s problem, this restriction is not binding when the vacancy post-
ing cost is linear. In steady state at least, the planner has no incentive to
reallocated workers across ￿rms because total output is already maximized
given aggregate employment. However, because employment is too high in
the single wage equilibrium and the allocation of employment is sub-optimal
except in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, it is possible that
the dispersed equilibrium with search-on-the job yields higher welfare than
the single wage equilibrium.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper is to show that a dispersed wage steady state equi-
librium exists in a version of the search and matching model in which ￿rms
have many employees, face diminishing returns in production, and wages are
the outcome of intra-￿rm bargaining as modeled by Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
Helpman and Iskhoki (2008) establish that a unique single wage equilibrium
exists in this environment. In this paper, I prove that a generically unique
dispersed wage equilibrium also exists with the property that more produc-
tive ￿r m sp a yh i g h e rw a g e si fp r o d u c t i v i t yd i ﬀers across ￿rms and employed
workers are allowed to search. Finally, employment is lower in the dispersed
wage equilibrium but welfare need not be because employment exceeds the
social optimum in the single wage equilibrium. Excessive employment arises
because employing another worker reduces the wage paid to all employees
when the wage is the outcome of the Stole-Zwibel bilateral bargaining game.
Employment is higher in the dispersed wage equilibrium because search by
employed workers labor turnover and wage competition between ￿rms and
eﬀects reduce the incentive to create jobs.
The obvious unanswered question has to do with stability of equilibrium.
W i l lt h em a r k e tc o n v e r g et ot h es i n g l ew a g eo rt ot h ed i s p e r s ew a g es t e a d y
state equilibrium? When the market is not in steady state, the nature of
the wage equation implies that wages will diﬀer and, consequently, employed
worker will search. Is this fact suﬃcient to guarantee continued search in
the transition and hence convergence of the market distribution to the non-
degenerate steady state? Answering this question is a subject for future
theoretical research.
22References
[1] Bartelsman, E., J. Haltiwanger, and S. Scarpetta (2008), "Cross Coun-
try Diﬀerences in Productivity: The Role of Allocative Eﬃciency," Uni-
versity of Maryland, mimeo.
[2] Burdett, K, and K. Judd (1983) "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econo-
metrica, 51(4) :955-969.
[3] Burdett, K, and D.T. Mortensen (1998) ￿Wage Diﬀerentials, Employer
Size and Unemployment," International Economic Review 39: 257-273.
[4] Cahuc, P., F. Marque, and E. Wasmer (2007) "A Theory of Wages
and Labor Demand with Intra￿rm Bargaining and Matching Frictions,"
forthcoming in the International Economic Review.
[5] Cahuc, P., F. Posel-Vinay, J-M Robin (2006) ￿Wage Bargaining with
On-the-job Search: Theory and Evidence￿, Econometrica, 74(2), 323-
64.
[6] Helpman, E., and O. Iskhoki (2008) "Labor Market Rigidities, Trade,
and Unemployment," NBER Working Paper 13365.
[7] Hosios, A.J. (1990). ￿On the Eﬃciency of Matching and Related Models
of Search and Unemployment￿, Review of Economic Studies, 57(2): 279-
98.
[8] Mortensen, D.T., (1978). ￿Speci￿c capital and labor turnover," The Bell
Journal of Economics 9:572. 586.
[9] Mortensen, D.T. (2003) Wage Dispersion, Why are similar worker paid
diﬀerently?, MIT Press.
[10] Pissarides, C.A., (1984). "Eﬃcient Job Rejection," Economic Journal,
Conference Papers.
[11] Postel-Vinay, F. and J.-M. Robin (2004) ￿To Match Or Not To Match?
Optimal Wage Policy with Endogenous Worker Search Intensity￿, Re-
view of Economic Dynamics, 7(2), 297-331.
[12] Smith, E. (1999), "Search, Concave Production, and Labor Force Size,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2(2): 456-471.
23[13] Stole, L.A., J. Zwiebel (1996) "Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-
Binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies 63:375-410.
24